The Supreme Court delivered yet another plot twist in a peace process marked by disruptions and surprises. Voting unanimously, the high court’s 15 magistrates excluded Sulu province from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) less than a year before the region’s first parliamentary elections.
On what ground? The high court cited Sulu’s “no” vote in the 2019 plebiscite to create BARMM.
What are the implications of the SC decision to Sulu and to the peace process? Who stands to gain and lose from the ruling? Will it trigger new conflicts?
PCIJ researcher Guinevere Latoza spoke with Georgi Engelbrecht, International Crisis Group senior analyst for the Philippines, to answer these questions.
Read excerpts from the interview.
How would you explain the gravity of the ruling for someone who might not grasp it yet?
On the positive side, the ruling affirmed the constitutionality of the Bangsamoro Organic Law. It also reminded the Bangsamoro parliament to respect IP rights and not “diminish” their rights.
But in the end, the bombshell was about Sulu. Here the court opined that due to the plebiscite results, the majority of Sulu voted against the Organic Law, Sulu has the right to be out of BARMM.
How important is Sulu in the Bangsamoro’s struggle for self-determination?
In the past it was of course very important, and one of the cradles of the revolution. The MNLF rebellion partly originated in Sulu. Nur Misuari from Sulu has been widely considered one of the fathers of the Moro revolution. But also, the MNLF later on signed a peace agreement with the government in 1976 and 1996. Throughout, the movement has both fought the government and maintained ceasefires, etc. Sulu was also part of the ARMM, so the result of the Bangsamoro struggle. At present, Sulu is of course part of Bangsamoro in the wider consciousness of many people.
But Sulu also had its own way and it is reflective of the heterogeneity of the Bangsamoro. The Sulu Sultanate was aligned but not identical with the other Sultanates in the southern Philippines. Before the ARMM there was no real cohesive entity uniting all the major ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
So, what we see here is a tension between symbols, history but also practical realities and politics.
What we see here is a tension between symbols, history but also practical realities and politics.
Georgi Engelbrecht, International Crisis Group senior analyst for the Philippines
If we go further, a related question is the feeling about the Sabah claim. We know that the Sulu Sultanate has strong feelings about this theme, which is why when we had the Lahad Datu incident, things were complicated but in the end did not disrupt the peace process. In that sense, Sabah matters perhaps more for the Tausug than the other Bangsamoro constituencies. Something to think about!
Who do you think stands to gain or lose from the decision?
First, to a certain degree, the peace process is a winner. Without a doubt the Organic Law and BARMM have been clearly affirmed as constitutional projects. Second, the local government leadership of Sulu is the winner since the petition affirms their objective. Right now, they are devoid of an additional bureaucratic or governance layer and go back to the national government.
Moreover, one can wonder whether MILF has been a winner. If elections are postponed, it gives them the chance to both prepare for the elections or further work on their governance. If elections take place, it is arguably easier now for UBJP since one of their rivals is out.
one can wonder whether MILF has been a winner. If elections are postponed, it gives them the chance to both prepare for the elections or further work on their governance. If elections take place, it is arguably easier now for UBJP since one of their rivals is out.
Are the people of Sulu the winner? This remains to be seen. Those employed by BARMM are losing their jobs and some students will for example lose educational programs. But maybe some Tausug feel that now they get more from the national government and even the province.
For sure, whether people think they gained or lost, the decision seems to be driven by elite actors. But online, we also see broad discourse between people linked to the net and commenting. Unfortunately, the most marginalized people, those without internet access or fundamental services, cannot contribute to the debate. Getting those voices is essential, despite of course some advocates speaking on their behalf.
But the peace process and the autonomous government can also be losers. It is possible the block grant will be newly calculated and less money will trickle in. There is also a question about whether Sulu will benefit from resources outside its immediate waters, and to what extent the cooperation with the national government will financially empower the local governments.
What consequences does Sulu’s non-inclusion have on the peace process?
I think first, we need to ask ourselves the question whether the Bangsamoro transition and governance are fully equal to the peace process. Also, what peace process do we talk about — the GPH-MILF peace process, the remnants of the GRP-MNLF peace process or the convergence and culmination of both that are feeding into the BTA and BARMM?
One of the promises of BARMM has been to improve peace and order, deliver better services and develop a suitable political system. One of the reasons for Sulu skepticism has been the second element: What did BARMM do, what projects did it implement? Recently, Sulu improved a bit in the poverty statistics. Who is the main actor for this change? The province, the region, national government, all of the above? Or is the answer more procedural? The slow demise of the Abu Sayyaf network and the peaceful relations between government and the MNLF all contributed to a stronger enabling environment for business, a degree of investment etc. We also have seen NGO work contributing to rido resolution.
Will there be an impact on conflict? I don’t think so, but there are some considerations. First, there might be political conflict between some clans who may decide to oppose the Tan dynasty in the medium-term or the long-term. The battle space will be in Sulu and key politicians won’t be accommodated in BARMM. How will they be influential? This may risk political infighting and perhaps political violence. Moreover, if key leaders of the MNLF will not feel accommodated in whatever political equation there will be, there might also be consequences in terms of local conflict. A wider unrest is very hard to imagine, however. — PCIJ.org